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It isn’t worth my while to debate every ambitious
Darwinist who wants to try hard at ridiculing the
opposition, so my general policy is that Darwinists
have to put a significant figure at risk before I will
agree to a debate. That means specifically [Richard]
Dawkins or [Stephen Jay] Gould, or someone of like
stature and public visibility.
So wrote Phillip E. Johnson, former University of
California at Berkeley law professor and founder of the
“Intelligent Design” movement, in April 2001. Had either
Dawkins or Gould met his challenge, it would have been a
coup for the then-decade-old movement. After all, such
well-respected minds would only entertain the most serious
of challenges. Intelligent Design (ID) theorists could
therefore claim some measure of victory by having the
debate at all; however, because of their respective pedi-
grees, Dawkins or Gould would be held to higher standards.
For precisely that reason, the two biologists resolved to
deny Johnson and his supporters their desired platform: in a
draft of an open letter to be co-signed by Gould, Dawkins
responded, “...we shall cultivate our evolutionary gardens,
occasionally engaging in the more exacting and worthwhile
task of debating each other.” (This episode is recounted in
Dawkins’ collection of short works, “A Devil’s Chaplain,”
in the essay entitled “Unfinished Correspondence with a
Darwinian Heavyweight.”)
The task may not only be an exacting and worthwhile
one, but also one to inflame intellectual passions and fuel
an academic rivalry.
The history of science—which is, after all, a history of
all-too-human scientists—is replete with conflict. Recall
how Newton antagonized Leibniz over the nature of space;
imagine how the sparks must have flown when Einstein
took Bohr and his nascent quantum theory to task. When it
was at its most heated, the feud between Dawkins and
Gould was waged as publicly as scientific debate may be.
Their exchanges played out in the pages of such widely
circulated periodicals as the New York Review of Books, to
say nothing of each theorist’s own best-selling popular
works. As a result, even a marginally informed layperson
would have been aware of the debate’s existence, if not its
details.
Unfortunately, it is in the details that the Dawkins–
Gould debate differs from those other well-known
academic feuds, and this has been a source of trouble
for evolutionary biology in general. The popular model of
a scientific debate is that of a zero-sum game: The
triumph of one party demands repudiation of the other.
Space and time are either absolute quantities or not;
quantum mechanics is either true or false. It is perhaps for
this reason that Johnson and his Intelligent Design ilk
have placed so much emphasis on Dawkins and Gould.
After all, if one well-respected biologist follows Darwin
and another equally well-respected biologist disagrees
with the first, then there can hardly be consensus about
the validity of evolutionary theory. Nevertheless, the
exchange between Dawkins and Gould does not fit this
misconceived winner-takes-all form.
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It is therefore to his credit that Kim Sterelny opens his
survey of the debate, entitled Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival
of the Fittest, with an explanation of what Dawkins and
Gould hold in common, proceeding to what is at stake for
the opponents only after laying out what is taken for
granted. Both are avowed disciples of Darwin and his
theory of evolution by means of natural selection. Both
have defended the idea that, within any population whose
reproductive rate outstrips its means of survival, advanta-
geous traits inherited genetically will tend to be preserved.
Both agree that, given a geological timescale, these
preserved traits will eventually accumulate in new forms
of life. Where the two differ is in their interpretations of
natural selection’s scope and meaning.
Proceeding through Dawkins vs. Gould one may be
struck by how often these antagonists (described in the
book’s back cover as being engaged in a “savage battle”)
accommodate one another. With few exceptions, each
chapter follows a similar pattern: a summary of the
biological facts followed by a survey of the combatants’
common ground and the point of departure taken by one
from the other. Far from homogenizing the titular figures,
however, this approach ultimately serves to give a clear
summary of the distinct intellectual spaces they occupy.
Those readers who enter into the text lacking knowledge of
either figure’s works will find excellent summaries of the
broad trends in each career.
What follows is a sort of “greatest hits” compilation.
From The Selfish Gene, The Extended Phenotype and
The Blind Watchmaker Sterelny draws out the concepts
central to Dawkins’ view of biology. Dawkins has built
his career upon the foundations of his selfish gene
theory, wherein biology is cast as a mechanistic system
similar to one of the physical sciences. The treatment
given in this paper illustrates how it is possible that even
the most complex organic traits might be explained in
terms of the slow, steady action of simple laws (natural
selection) upon the system’s most basic components
(genes). This so-called gene’s eye view of evolution is
contrasted with that of Gould, as distilled from such
works as Wonderful Life, Full House, and The Structure of
Evolutionary Theory. Gould’s central themes of contingen-
cy and diversity create a view of biology in which the
constant pace of natural selection may be perturbed by the
vagaries of a chaotic environment. Whereas the nuance of
Gould’s evolutionary theory might come across as more
complicated than Dawkins’ to a neophyte, Sterelny keeps
his descriptions of each concept as clear and uncomplicated
as possible.
Sterelny’s success in isolating the essential points of
contention between Dawkins and Gould follows from an
important insight into their debate: It is, for the most part,
less over science than it is over philosophy (it comes as no
surprise that Sterelny is himself a professor of philosophy at
Victoria University in Wellington). He writes that the
arguments between the two “within evolutionary theory
are exacerbated by different assessments of science itself ”
(p. 14). Dawkins, the consummate Oxford scientist, sees
science as an all-encompassing reductionist program; Gould,
a polymath equally comfortable writing about such disparate
subjects as DiMaggio-era baseball and Cambrian-era
trilobites, takes a more limited view of science as on a par
with other modes of knowledge.
This dichotomy, as drawn by Sterelny, is largely
accurate but has the potential to ultimately become a part
of a larger problem. At one point he writes that Gould
built his career “arguing for the existence of large-scale
patterns…not explained by natural selection” (p.79). One
will never find in Gould’s work the claim that natural
selection is insufficient to the task of explaining biological
phenomena. Rather, Gould’s emphasis is on the claim that
its sufficiency ought not to be overextended to explain
phenomena for which it is unnecessary; he often cautions
against thinking of all organic properties as adaptive.
Sterelny does consider these ideas, particularly in his
chapter entitled “Selection and Adaptation,” but mostly as
contrasted with the “adaptationist” leanings of the “ultra-
Darwinist” Dawkins. If this is the sort of locution that
might inspire pumped fists and gleeful cheers from the
aforementioned Intelligent Design theorists, it is only
because it is so easily misread.
Perhaps, because of the summary nature of his survey,
Sterelny sometimes seems to cast Dawkins and Gould in
the roles created for them in the ID misrepresentation of
their debate, despite his efforts to paint both biologists with
the same Darwinian brush. In particular, to cast Gould as
opposed to some ‘ultra-Darwinian’ orthodoxy, absent the
proper context, has the potential to lead to such foolishness
as that found on Creationist websites that claim Gould as a
closeted champion of their cause. Dawkins is only more
Darwinian than Gould insofar as he is more Darwinian than
Darwin himself; where the father of modern biology saw
natural selection as the “main but not exclusive” mecha-
nism for evolutionary change (as written in The Origin of
Species), Dawkins sees selection as an agent that is both
exclusive and universal. Gould’s rejection of this extension
of Darwin’s theory does not entail rejection of that theory’s
core. The absence of this explicit clarification from
Sterelny’s book may lead to misunderstanding for those
readers whose preconceptions of this debate have been
shaped by a media uncritical of the ID theorists’ account.
This is a minor issue overall; however, given the historical
context of the relevant debate, it is one that the lay reader
ought to bear in mind.
Notwithstanding this fault, Sterelny’s Dawkins vs.
Gould is a worthwhile read on several levels. For those
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whose interest in evolutionary biology has not yet
carried them into the field’s contemporary discourse,
the book not only gives a clear and accurate summary
of the subjects’ corpora but also points the way towards
where to turn next. Sterelny’s extensive list of suggested
readings should also prove useful to more advanced
readers, many of whom will benefit from the conceptual
clarity provided by Sterelny’s review of the material.
Even as the titular clash of personalities has, sadly, had
its final chapter written, Sterelny’s book should serve as
the starting point for those inspired to carry on the clash
of ideas.
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